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INTRODUCTION OF VIDEOTAPING OF
INTERROGATIONS AND THE LESSONS OF THE
IMAICHI CASE: A CASE OF CONVENTIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY-MAKING IN JAPAN
Setsuo Miyazawa and Mari Hirayama†
Abstract: Malcolm M. Feeley examined cases of criminal justice reform in the
United States, where reforms can be conceived and initiated in a very open structure, but
implementation of the introduced reforms can be handed over to highly fragmented
implementers. The story of mandatory videotaping of interrogations and accompanying
changes in Japan demonstrates the reform process at the other end of the scale, where the
members of the criminal justice establishment can exert a strong influence even at the
conception and initiation stages, and have even stronger control at the implementation
and routinization stages. We believe that Feeley’s theoretical framework can be
expanded to be more generally applicable to court reforms outside the United States.
This could be achieved by introducing the degree of openness of the policy-making
process at the conceptualization and initiation stages, and by introducing a degree of
fragmentation of the policy-making process at the implementation and routinization
stages as central independent variables which determine the course of the reform.
Cite as: Setsuo Miyazawa and Mari Hirayama, Introduction of Videotaping of
Interrogations and the Lessons of the Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal
Justice Policy-Making in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 149 (2017).

I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Malcolm M. Feeley’s Analysis of Court Reforms in the United
States and the Purpose of This Paper

In 1983, Malcolm M. Feeley published a seminal book on criminal
court reforms in the United States, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple
Solutions Fail.1 According to Feeley, the primary problem with American
courts is that “the courts themselves have . . . fostered unrealistic
expectations, and promoted bold but often empty solutions.” 2 Such
problems arise due to changes caused by raised standards and increased
†
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1
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983).
2
Id. at xiii.
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attention from politicians, the press, and the scholarly community. Even
when these changes produce significant achievements, they often result in
disillusionment and disappointment. Feeley emphasizes fragmentation as
the American courts’ most visible and natural quality.3 The American
courts are arenas in which a range of competing and conflicting interests
collide. Accordingly, this fragmentation appears to make coherent
implementation of introduced reforms particularly difficult. Planned
changes often fail because innovators do not understand these characteristics
of the court. Feeley identified the following five stages of planned change:
1) diagnosis or conception; 2) initiation; 3) implementation; 4)
routinization; and 5) evaluation. 4 In the four cases Feeley analyzed,
fragmentation seems to have worked most strongly at the stages of
implementation and routinization. In those stages, fragmentation produced
a result contrary to that expected by those who had diagnosed the status quo
and initiated the given reform.
What was Feeley’s solution for reforming the American courts?
Instead of bold reforms conceived and initiated from outside the judiciary,
he essentially proposed to let the courts introduce reforms by themselves
through the course of litigation. Feeley argued that litigation is well suited
to pursue changes in complex institutions because “[i]t is problem
specific[,] . . . [i]t is ameliorative[,] . . . [i]t is incremental[,] . . . and
litigation is relatively inexpensive.”5 This argument reminds the readers of
his later research on prison reforms through judicial decisions.6
At the time of its publication, Feeley’s book was considered “one of
the best statements of the policy science . . . tradition within the sociology of
law.”7 It has continued to inspire research on various areas of court reform
in the United States until today.8 Given its prominence within research on
American court reforms, one may be tempted to try to expand this argument
to a more universally applicable framework on court reform. East Asian
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 35–37.
5
Id. at 214.
6
See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998).
7
Austin Sarat, Courts and Court Reform: Which Appearances Are the Most Deceiving?, 8 ALSA F.
454, 458 (1984) (review of FEELEY, supra note 1).
8
Most recent examples include Alissa Pollitz Worden et al., Court Reform: Why Simple Solutions
Might Not Fail? A Case Study of Implementation of Counsel at First Appearance, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
521 (2017). The authors of this paper state that, “[w]e frame our inquiry around Malcolm Feeley’s thesis
that court reforms are more likely to fail than to succeed, and draw conclusions about the conditions under
which such reforms are likely to be successful.” Id. at 522.
3
4
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countries can provide cases for such an expansion because many reforms
have been recently introduced there.9 Japan is no exception.10
Our research in Japan suggests three main areas of expansion of
Feeley’s theoretical framework. The first point of expansion concerns the
stages of diagnosis or conception and initiation. While Feeley’s analysis
suggests that idealistic expectations of reform outside the court system can
often have a strong influence at these stages in the United States, the
policy-making process in Japan is likely to be far more closed. Those who
have worked in the existing court system can also often prevent the
influence of idealistic reforms outside the court system. Reforms
conceptualized and initiated in such a system may be far less idealistic, and
remain within the boundary acceptable to those who have been working in
the existing system. Therefore, it seems necessary to add the degree of
openness within the policy-making process at the stages of diagnosis or
conception and initiation as a new variable to Feeley’s analytical
framework.
The second point of expansion of Feeley’s framework concerns the
stages of implementation, routinization, and evaluation. Feeley’s analysis
suggests that the highly fragmented nature of the American courts often
makes faithful implementation of idealistic reforms difficult if they are
conceptualized and initiated outside the court system. Reforms are
therefore often routinized in ways acceptable and possible under the existing
conditions of the court system. Due to this limitation, the evaluation is
likely a failure from the perspective of idealistic reformers who
conceptualized and initiated reforms outside the court system. In Japan,
the court system is a national bureaucracy in which a majority of judges join
immediately after completing the apprenticeship period, even though they
have no experience as practicing attorneys. These judges remain on the
bench until the mandatory retirement at the age of 65.11 They are carefully
See generally LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN ASIA: JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND THE INFLUENCE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW (John O. Haley & Toshiko Takenaka eds., 2014); EAST ASIA’S RENEWED RESPECT FOR
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPES IN EAST ASIA
(Setsuo Miyazawa et al. eds., 2015).
10
See Setsuo Miyazawa, Law Reform, Lawyers, and Access to Justice, in JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW
39–89 (Gerald Paul McAlinn ed., 2007) [hereinafter Law Reform, Lawyers, and Access to Justice]; Setsuo
Miyazawa, Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System Reform in Japan: An
Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313 (2013) [hereinafter Justice
System Reform in Japan]. See also other articles in the same symposium issue.
11
For an outline of the Japanese court system, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Introduction: Japan, in
JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW, supra note 10, at 30–38.
9
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appointed, evaluated, relocated, and promoted by the administrative organ
called the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court. Since judges’
decisions are closely monitored by the General Secretariat, and decisions
contrary to Supreme Court precedents and mainstream judicial decisions
negatively impact career trajectories,12 most judges are likely to faithfully
implement and routinize reforms introduced through the conception and
initiation stages dominated by members of the existing court system. The
evaluation of the result by members of the existing court system is likely to
be positive, while the evaluation of the result by outside reformers whose
proposals were totally or largely rejected in the conception and initiation
stages is likely to be negative. Accordingly, the degree of fragmentation
must be considered as a variable during the stages of implementation and
routinization. Although the American court system may be highly
fragmented, the Japanese court system may be highly unfragmented.
The third point for expansion of Feeley’s analytical framework is the
role of litigation in court reform. While Feeley found a significant role for
litigation in prison reform in the United States,13 the same cannot be said
for Japan. Litigation is unlikely to play a significant role in Japanese court
reform because the administrators of the court system react unfavorably to
judges who challenge the existing system.14 To refute this claim, one may
consult the 2002 case involving the arrest and punishment of prison guards
who allegedly used excessive force to subdue inmates in Nagoya Prison.
This poor treatment served as a catalyst for the eventual amendment of the
century-old Prison Law.15 However, rather than administrative litigation
seeking prison reform, this case arose from criminal charges filed by the
prosecutor seeking punishment of individual guards. The Ministry of
Justice had already initiated the amendment of the Prison Law long before
this case. The criminal case’s apparent contribution to passing the
12
On the lack of independence of individual judges in Japan, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B.
RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003);
Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC
COMMUNITY 263–91 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994) [Administrative Control of Japanese Judges]; Mark A.
Levin, Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on Instrumental Judicial Administration in Japan, 20 PAC.
RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 265, 265–318 (2010).
13
See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6.
14
See sources cited supra note 12.
15
See Takuya Asakura, Prison Abuses in Spotlight Following Guard Arrests, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 13,
2002, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2002/11/13/national/
prison-abuses-in-spotlight-following-guard-arrests; Eric Johnston, Prison Reforms Seen as Too Little,
and
Way
Too
Late,
JAPAN
TIMES,
June
26,
2007,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/06/26/reference/prison-reforms-seen-as-too-little-and-way-too-lat
e/. JAPAN TIMES, an English daily in Japan, is available on the LexisNexis database.
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amendment was a helpful byproduct rather than the purpose of the litigation.
Therefore, one should consider the prevalence of litigation seeking to
reform the existing court and justice system as a variable when analyzing
the relative merits of differing routes to reform. Such litigation seems to
be more widely utilized in the United States than in Japan. Accordingly,
the role of litigation may be different between the countries.
The purpose of this Article is limited to the first and second points for
the expansion of Feeley’s analytical framework. It will discuss adding a
degree of openness to the policy-making process during the diagnosis or
conception and initiation stages and the degree of court system
fragmentation at the implementation and routinization stages as new
variables to Feeley’s analytical framework. This Article will illustrate how
members of the existing court system can repel the reform proposal from
outside and transform it into one which would not harm their interests, and
may even benefit them. This conclusion is supported by analyzing the
process of introducing mandatory videotaping of interrogations in Japan,
which was proposed in May 2016 and will be implemented by June 2019.16
For the first time in Japanese history, this reform requires police and
prosecutors to videotape interrogations. However, legislators managed to
limit application of this reform to only a tiny proportion of cases. This
reform is not about the court system, but rather about the investigation.
However, the investigation depends heavily on confessions obtained by
police and prosecutors, and is often considered the most crucial part of the
entire criminal justice system in Japan.17 This example of the effect of the
policy-making process on criminal investigations in Japan is an excellent
illustration of the conventional process of policy-making in criminal justice
in Japan.
B.

Conventional and Extraordinary Policy-Making Processes on
Criminal Justice in Japan

It should be noted here that the preceding three articles in this
symposium on Japan discussed examples of extraordinary policy-making
See generally Keiji soshōhō tō no ichibu o kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act Amending Part of the Code of
Criminal Procedure], Law No. 54 of 2016 (Japan). For the full text of the original proposal submitted by the
Ministry of Justice on March 13, 2015, and related information, see Keiji soshōhō tō no ichibu o kaiseisuru
hōritsuan [Bill to Amend Part of the Code of Criminal Procedure], HŌMUSHŌ [MINISTRY JUST.],
http://www.moj.go.jp/keiji1/keiji14_00103.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
17
See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 243–75
(2002).
16
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process.18 In ordinary cases, any major reform proposal for the legal
system is referred by the Justice Minister to the Legislative Deliberation
Council (“LDC”) (Hosei Shingikai) established under the Justice Ministry.19
The LDC is divided into several subcommittees. The Justice Minister
refers the reform proposal to an appropriate subcommittee, where a majority
of members are current members of the judicial establishment. These
members include the judiciary, the Justice Ministry, and other governmental
agencies. Although the membership of these committees is supplemented
by academics, many of the members share the establishment’s perspectives.
The Justice Ministry works as the secretariat for the LDC, which prepares
the agenda and materials for deliberation and even drafts recommendations
to be presented to the Justice Minister. The subcommittee’s draft
recommendations are then presented at a general meeting of the parent LDC
which authorizes the draft and presents the final recommendation to the
Justice Minister.
The membership of the LDC subcommittees on criminal justice is
largely fixed. For instance, the four most recent subcommittees on
criminal justice consisted of voting members (iin), non-voting members
(kanji), and related officials (kankei-kan):
(1) Subcommittee on the lay judge system: four judges,20 six
Justice Ministry officials, including prosecutors, two executive
police officers,21 three practicing attorneys, eight academics,
one member of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau,22 and one
member of a crime victim assistance organization;23

Daniel H. Foote, Diversification of the Japanese Judiciary, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 7 (2017);
Matthew J. Wilson, Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious Criminal
Trials in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 75 (2017); Erik Herber, Victim Participation in Japan, 27 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 119 (2017).
19
For the role of shingikai in Japanese politics, see generally FRANK J. SCHWARTZ, ADVICE AND
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF CONSULTATION IN JAPAN (1998).
20
Judges in these subcommittees may include those holding administrative positions in the General
Secretariat of the Supreme Court.
21
We use the term “executive police officers” to mean top-ranking police officers who occupy
policy-making positions at the National Police Agency or the Tokyo Metropolitan Police.
22
The Cabinet Legislation Bureau reviews draft bills before submission to the Cabinet. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 185.
23
Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai keijihō (saiban’in seido kankei) bukai iin
tō meibo [Legislative Deliberation Criminal Justice Laws (Lay Judge System) Subcommittee Member List]
(May 21, 2014), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000118545.pdf. Please note that membership might
have changed between the time of writing and publication.
18
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(2) Special Subcommittee on the Criminal Justice System in a
New Era (Shin-Jidai no Keiji Shiho Seido Tokubetsu Bukai):
three judges, one former judge, eight Justice Ministry officials,
including prosecutors, one former prosecutor, four executive
police officers, one former executive police officer, five
practicing attorneys, eleven academics, one member of the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, one member of a crime victim
assistance organization, and five other members;24
(3) Subcommittee on sex offenses: three judges, six Justice
Ministry officials, including prosecutors, two executive police
officers, three practicing attorneys, eleven academics, one
member of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and one member of
a crime victim assistance organization;25
(4) Subcommittee on juvenile law: five judges, ten Justice
Ministry officials, including prosecutors, three executive police
officers, four practicing attorneys, twelve academics, one
member of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, one member of a
crime victim organization, and one member from a
newspaper.26
These judges, Justice Ministry officials, and executive police officers
presented perspectives of the mainstream members of the criminal justice
system in Japan. Most academics who served on these subcommittees
were law professors. Two of them served on three subcommittees each,
while eight of them served on two subcommittees each. Together, these
academics represent the “criminal justice establishment” in Japan. The
conventional process of making criminal justice policy in Japan is
dominated by this establishment.
Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai shinjidai no keiji shihō seido tokubetsu
bukai iin tō meibo [Legislative Deliberation Council Criminal Justice System in a New Era Special
Subcommittee Member List] (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000122717.pdf. This
subcommittee deliberated on the introduction of mandatory videotaping of interrogations, as will be
discussed later in this paper.
25
Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai keijihō (sei hanzai kankei) bukai iin tō
meibo [Legislative Deliberation Criminal Justice Laws (Sexual Offenses) Subcommittee Member List]
(May 25, 2016), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001184600.pdf.
26
Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai shōnenhō, keijihō (shōnen nenrei,
hanzaisha shogū kankei) bukai iin tō meibo [Legislative Deliberation Council Juvenile Law, Criminal
Justice Laws (Juvenile Age, Criminal Treatment) Subcommittee Member List] (Oct. 30, 2017),
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001239481.pdf.
24
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Both the reform of judicial appointment discussed by Daniel H. Foote
and the introduction of the lay judge system discussed by Matthew J.
Wilson did not explore this conventional policy-making process. The
business community, represented by the Japan Business Federation
(Keidanren)27— the most powerful interest group working closely with the
Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) which had controlled the government for
most periods since its founding in 1955—demanded that the government
expand and improve the judiciary and legal profession. In support of this
goal, the business community proposed a wide range of reforms in 1998,
including legal education reform. Since the Justice Ministry and the
judiciary were targeted by the demanded reform, the LDP government
established the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) (Shiho Seido
Kaikaku Shingikai). Instead of falling under the Justice Ministry, the JSRC
fell directly under the Cabinet.28 Of the thirteen members, the JSRC had
only one member each who respectively represented the judiciary, the
procuracy, and practicing attorneys, so that there were expectations that the
JSRC and the implementation process which followed would produce
extensive reforms.
However, members of the existing system often managed to limit
reform to levels much lower than expected by progressive reformers outside
the system. Reform of judicial appointments and the introduction of the
lay judge system were no exception.
In the case of the appointment of lower court judges, which before
was handled entirely by the Personnel Bureau of the General Secretariat of
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court preempted reforms from outside and
established a consultative committee which would evaluate judicial

27
See KEIDANREN [JAPAN BUS. FED’N], http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2017);
see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 100–05 (explaining the role of Keidanren in Japanese politics in the
1990s).
28
For an early observation about the JSRC, see Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in
Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 89, 89–121 (2001). For a semi-official
English translation of the final recommendations presented by the JSRC to the Prime Minister in June 2001,
see THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council - For
a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET (June
12, 2001), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/0012report.html. For a warning that reforms initiated by
the JSRC may be further reduced and narrowed through the implementation process which returned to the
traditional process dominated by members of the existing system, see Law Reform, Lawyers, and Access to
Justice, supra note 10, at 39–89. For a recent evaluation of the justice system reform initiated by the JSRC,
see Justice System Reform in Japan, supra note 10, at 313–47.
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candidates presented by the Personnel Bureau. The result almost
completely prevents practicing attorneys from being appointed as judges.29
The lay-judge system seems to have fared better. More than 95% of
those who served as lay judges felt it was a worthwhile experience.30 Still,
the introduced system was much less revolutionary than what reform
proponents outside the criminal justice establishment wanted. 31 While
outside reformers wanted to democratize the criminal trial system by
introducing a jury system in order to minimize the involvement of
professional judges, the JSRC proposed a system in which professional
judges and lay people worked together. The JSRC defined the purpose of
the new system not in terms of the democratization of criminal trials, but in
terms of promoting public understanding and enhancing public trust in the
administration of criminal justice.32 The system’s application was limited
to the most serious types of cases, which accounted for only 2 or 3% of all
criminal cases. Further, by requiring any decision made by the six lay judges
be supported by at least one of the three professional judges who decided
the case, professional judges essentially maintained a veto power.33
The incorporation of victim participation in criminal trials discussed
by Erik Herber was a more conventional reform effort than the previous two
cases because it was based on a recommendation by the LDC.34 However,
it was still an extraordinary case of policy-making because the reform was
initiated by an organization established by bereaved families of crime
victims instead of members of the criminal justice establishment. Crime
victims, bereaved families, and their representatives obtained far more rights
See Takayuki Ii, Japan’s Judicial System May Change, but Its Fundamental Nature Stays Virtually
the Same? Recent Japanese Reforms on the Judicial Appointment and Evaluation, 36 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 459, 459–74 (2013).
30
Justice System Reform in Japan, supra note 10, at 341.
31
For a view from a prominent member of the reform movement outside the criminal justice
establishment, see Satoru Shinomiya, Adversarial Procedure without a Jury: Is Japan’s System Adversarial,
Inquisitorial, or Something Else?, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES
AND COMPARISONS 114, 114–27 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002). Progressive
reformers like Shinomiya proposed to introduce a jury system exactly like that in the United States or a
system where lay judges far outnumber professional judges.
32
See Noboru Yanase, Deliberative Democracy and the Japanese Saiban-in (Lay Judge) Trial
System, 3 ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 327, 330–34 (2016).
33
For an outline of the system, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in
Japan: The Saiban-in System and Victim Participation in Japan in International Perspectives, 42 INT’L J. L.
CRIM. & JUST. 71, 71–82 (2014) [hereinafter Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan].
34
See Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness and the Rising Populism in
Japanese Criminal Justice Policies, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 47, 47–77 (2008) [hereinafter The Politics of
Increasing Punitiveness].
29
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than, for example, those making victim impact statements in the United
States because victims may behave like prosecutors in trials, questioning the
defendant and recommending a sentence.35 And yet, the system did not
seriously erode the power of prosecutors. Rather, the system provided
prosecutors new resources to buttress their demands for convictions and
harsher penalties. This was because victim representatives invariably
demand harsh penalties, most typically the death penalty in homicide
cases.36 The Justice Ministry continues to appoint members of punitive
victim organizations to committees on criminal justice and shows no sign of
abolishing or diminishing the victim participation system within criminal
trials.37
These cases suggest that even reforms conceptualized and initiated in
unconventional ways can be implemented and routinized by members of the
existing system in such a way that they will not significantly affect the
judicial establishment’s power in countries where it is tightly formed and
unfragmented—such as Japan. If so, in cases of policy-making through
more conventional means in countries like Japan, members of the existing
system may be able to control the policy-making process more strongly,
even from the earlier stages of conceptualization and initiation. The rest of
this paper will present an analysis of such a case which took place in Japan
recently.
II.

CONVENTIONAL PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGISLATION
THE CASE OF MANDATORY VIDEOTAPING OF INTERROGATIONS
A.

Policy-Making
Interrogations

Process

of

Mandatory

IN JAPAN:

Videotaping

of

The case began with a crisis for police and prosecutors. An arrested
suspect may be detained for up to twenty-three days for each count he or she
is charged with in Japan, with the first three days at the discretion of police
and prosecutors and the following twenty days subject to judicial
authorization upon a prosecutor’s request.38 Most suspects are detained in
See Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan, supra note 33, at 75.
For an early analysis of lay judge trials where a victim representative participated, see David
Johnson, Early Returns from Japan’s New Criminal Trials, 36 ASIA-PAC. J. | JAPAN FOCUS 1, 1–15 (2009).
37
See The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness, supra note 34, at 47–77; See Setsuo Miyazawa, Will
Penal Populism in Japan Decline?: A Discussion, 33 JAPANESE J. SOC. CRIMINOLOGY 122, 122–35 (2008).
38
See SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME 11–33 (Frank G.
Bennett, Jr. trans., 1992); JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 22–36.
35
36
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police detention cells (ryuchijo) where interrogators try to obtain a
confession, as opposed to detention facilities (kochisho) managed by the
Justice Ministry. 39 This system has been criticized as “hostage-taking
justice” (hitojichi shiho)40 and has been described as a “hot bed” (onsho) of
false confessions leading to false convictions. Because defense lawyers
are not allowed to be present during interrogations, 41 videotaping of
interrogations was proposed as a remedy by the Japanese Bar and other
reformers.42
In March 2010, Toshikazu Sugaya, who had been sentenced to
indefinite imprisonment (life imprisonment with a possibility of parole) for
murder in 1990, was acquitted by a retrial based on new DNA evidence (the
“Ashikaga case”).43 Audiotapes of Sugaya’s interrogations by prosecutors
were found and showed how psychological pressure had been applied to
press him into making a false confession.44 The Japanese Bar and other
reformers used this case to bolster their demand for the videotaping of
interrogations.
In September 2010, Atsuko Muraki—a former head of the Welfare
Ministry’s Equal Employment, Children, and Families Bureau—was
acquitted by a trial court of a charge alleging she had issued a fabricated
certificate that falsely recognized an organization as a group for the disabled
in order to enable the group to use a postage discount system (the “Muraki
case”). Her indictment was based on the pretrial statements of her
co-defendant given to prosecutors.
But, the court considered the
possibility that those statements had been made under the pressure of

See SETSUO MIYAZAWA, supra note 38, at 21–23; JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 62.
Kazuko Ito, Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in Japan, 80 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1245, 1250 (2012).
41
See JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 74.
42
For a recommendation from an American scholar, see Richard A. Leo, Miranda, Confessions, and
Justice: Lessons for Japan?, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND
COMPARISONS, supra note 31, at 212–15.
43
Setsuko Kamiya, All Interrogations Must Be Taped: Sugaya, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/03/27/national/all-interrogations-must-be-taped-sugaya/#.WcbUp
bpFyc0.
44
Id. In Japan, arrested and detained suspects may not refuse interrogation itself, although they have
the right to remain silent. Interrogation will continue as long as they deny allegations. Continuing to deny
charges for a long period of time in solitary confinement without constant support of an attorney is often
unbearable. Suspects in such a situation may be tempted to make a false confession simply to escape these
circumstances without thinking about the consequences. Sugaya described such a psychological process in
his memoir. TOSHIKAZU SUGAYA, ENZAI: ARU HI WATASHI WA HANNNIN NI SARETA [FALSE CONVICTION:
ONE DAY, I WAS SUDDENLY MADE A CRIMINAL], 17–23 (2009).
39
40

160

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 1

leading questions from prosecutors.45 Furthermore, a prosecutor who had
investigated this case was indicted for tampering with evidence, and his two
former bosses in the same public prosecutor’s office were indicted46 and
subsequently convicted of similar charges. Since they were members of
the elite Special Investigation Squad (tokusobu) of the Osaka District Public
Prosecutors Office and Muraki was a prominent female civil servant, the
case attracted a great deal of attention and further fueled the debate over the
need for the videotaping of interrogations.47
In May 2011, Shoji Sakurai and Takao Sugiyama, who had been
sentenced to indefinite imprisonment for a murder-robbery in 1967, were
acquitted by a retrial (the “Fukawa case”).48 This was the seventh case in
postwar Japan in which a defendant previously sentenced to death or
indefinite imprisonment was acquitted in a retrial. The court pointed out
the possibility that the investigators had used leading questions while
interrogating the suspects, increasing the demand for introducing videotapes
of interrogations.
Meanwhile, the reformist Democratic Party of Japan (“DPJ”) won in
the Lower House election in September 2009. Its election manifesto called
for the videotaping of entire interrogations. Justice Minister Keiko Chiba
of the DPJ cabinet tried to introduce a bill based on the election manifesto,
but Hiroshi Nakai, a member of the same cabinet and the Chairman of the
National Public Safety Commission, which oversees the National Police
Agency, opposed it. Chiba backed down and proposed a “realistic review”
of the present system, meaning only a limited application of videotaping.49
Prosecutors led by the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office continued to
oppose the idea of complete videotaping and, instead started discretionary
partial videotaping. 50 Chiba created a private advisory body called
45
Indictment
under
Unjust
Scenario,
JAPAN
TIMES,
Sep.
14,
2010,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/09/14/editorials/indictment-under-unjust-scenario/#.WcbVf7pF
yc0.
46
Examine
Prosecution
Process,
JAPAN
TIMES,
Oct.
23,
2010,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/10/23/editorials/examine-prosecution-process/.
47
Ito, supra note 40, at 1271–73.
48
Case
Highlights
Judicial
Misdeeds,
JAPAN
TIMES,
May
28,
2011,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/05/28/editorials/case-highlights-judicial-misdeeds/.
49
Why
the
Investigative
Secrecy,
JAPAN
TIMES,
July
24,
2010,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/07/24/editorials/why-the-investigative-secrecy/. She simply
recommended that studies be carried out on limiting the scope of interrogations that must be videotaped.
50
Half-baked
Reform
Won’t
Cut
It,
JAPAN
TIMES,
Mar.
5,
2011,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/03/05/editorials/half-baked-reform-wont-cut-it/;
Minoru
Mitsutani, Top Prosecutor Opposes Fully Taped Interrogations, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 1,
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Kensatsu no Arikata Kentokai in Japanese, which literally translates to “The
Deliberative Committee on How the Prosecution Should Be.”51 This body
consisted of four practicing attorneys, two former judges, two former public
prosecutors, and two academics. Practicing attorneys wanted a broad
videotaping requirement, while prosecutors opposed it. Unable to reach a
consensus, in March 2011, the Kensatsu no Arikata Kentokai presented
Satsuki Eda, Chiba’s successor as Justice Minister, with a lukewarm
proposal that merely called for increasing the scope of partial videotaping
and establishing an in-house inspection team within public prosecutor’s
offices to check on prosecutorial activities.52 Notably, the proposal only
addressed prosecutorial interrogations, despite the fact that an
overwhelming majority of suspects were interrogated by police.
Nevertheless, Eda moved ahead and established the Special
Subcommittee on the Criminal Justice System in a New Era (Shin-Jidai no
Keiji Shiho Seido Tokubetsu Bukai) in the LDC in June 2011.53 While
most members of the Special Subcommittee were members of the criminal
justice establishment, it also included Atsuko Muraki, of the Muraki case,
and Masayuki Suo, the Director of the 1997 hit movie “Shall We Dance?”
as well as the 2007 legal movie “Soredemo Boku wa Yattenai” (I Just Didn’t
Do It), which is based on the true story of a young man falsely accused of
groping a young girl on a crowded train. Suo was nominated by the Japan
Federation of Bar Association, the national association of practicing
attorneys, upon request from Justice Minister Eda. 54
Muraki’s
appointment may have had a similar background.
Although videotaping was the main issue of deliberation, no members
of the subcommittee were scholars who had studied videotaping, and none
were psychologists who had studied interrogation. Instead, the Special
Subcommittee was dominated by members of the criminal justice
establishment, including past and current police executives, prosecutors,
2011, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/03/01/national/top-prosecutor-opposes-fully-taped-interroga
tions/.
51
On the use of private advisory bodies by cabinet ministers, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 105–
15.
52
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Reform,
JAPAN
TIMES,
Apr.
11,
2011,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/04/11/editorials/insufficient-evidence-of-reform/.
53
Judicial
System
Reform,
JAPAN
TIMES,
July
10,
2011,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/07/10/editorials/judicial-system-reform/.
54
MASAYUKI SUO, SOREDEMO BOKU WA KAIGI DE TATAKAU: DOKYUMENTO KEIJI SHIHO KAIKAKU
[STILL I FIGHT IN THE COMMITTEE: A DOCUMENT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM] vi (Iwanami Shoten
2015). Justice Minister Eda came from outside the criminal justice establishment and was working against
police and prosecutors who were resisting the introduction of mandatory videotaping of interrogations.
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judges, and conservative academics who had regularly served on LDC
subcommittees on criminal justice. Suo writes that he was told by his
attorney friends that “these members are hopeless.”55
Deliberation in the Special Subcommittee progressed extremely
slowly under the DPJ cabinet. The government had changed from the
more liberal DPJ to the more conservative coalition government of the LDP
and the Komeito56 as a result of their landslide victory in the Lower House
election in December 2012. The Special Subcommittee then submitted an
interim report to the parent Committee in February of 2013. The Japan
Times criticized that “the report appears to have forgotten the most
important goal: how to prevent false charges from being filed against
innocent people,” and reported that “opinions in general supported the
electronic recording of the entire interrogation process. But panel
members who formerly served as police officers vehemently opposed the
idea.”57 The interim report presented two options: (1) to require recording
of entire interrogations only in cases that must be handled by the lay judge
system and (2) to give discretion to police and prosecutors. The second
option would not change the status quo, and even the first option would only
apply to about 3% of all reported crimes and would exempt cases like the
Muraki case.
Deliberation in the Special Subcommittee dragged on one more year
without a conclusion. Police and prosecutors continued to oppose
mandatory recording of interrogations, arguing that it would make
interrogations more difficult.58 In March 2014, five non-lawyer members,
including Muraki and Suo, presented an unsuccessful proposal to record
interrogations for all crimes except minor cases, such as traffic violations.59
Soon after that, in May 2014, the Justice Ministry presented its own
proposal to the Special Subcommittee. It had two proposals regarding the
videotaping of interrogations: (1) to require both police and prosecutors to
record entire interrogations in cases that would be handled by the lay judge
system and (2) to require prosecutors to record entire interrogations only in
Id. at 6.
Its name is the same in Japanese and English. See KOMEITO, https://www.komei.or.jp/en/ (last
visited Aug. 7, 2017).
57
Reform
Panel
Pulls
its
Punches,
JAPAN
TIMES,
Feb.
22,
2013,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/02/22/editorials/reform-panel-pulls-its-punches/.
58
Transparent
Interrogations,
JAPAN
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13,
2014,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/02/13/editorials/transparent-interrogations/.
59
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TIMES,
Mar.
27,
2014,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/03/27/editorials/transparency-in-interrogations/.
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cases they initiated. In other words, prosecutors would be required to
record in a slightly broader range of cases than police.
There were two additional surprises in the Justice Ministry’s proposal.
One was to increase the number of crimes for which wiretapping was
allowed from four (drug crimes, gun crimes, group smuggling, and
organized murders) to fourteen, including but not limited to murder, battery,
assault, burglary, and the production of child pornography. The other was
to introduce a plea-bargaining system that would allow prosecutors to drop
an indictment in return for incriminating information against another
person.60 The proposed range of videotaping was very limited, yet it was
difficult for reformers like Muraki and Suo to reject, because doing so could
mean that a political opportunity for introducing videotaping of
interrogations would be lost for the near future. That was exactly why Suo
and Muraki accepted the whole package. 61
Although the Special
Subcommittee quickly decided to expand wiretapping and introduce plea
bargaining, it only mandated videotaped interrogations in cases to be tried
by the lay judge system, and provided exemptions in certain instances, such
as cases in which recording would make it impossible to obtain a
meaningful confession.62
When the Cabinet presented the bill to amend the Code of Criminal
Procedure and other related laws to introduce above-mentioned “reforms” to
the Diet in March 2015, The Japan Times warned that plea bargaining might
create “more chances for false charges.”63 The Lower House passed the
bill in August 2015,64 while the Upper House failed to pass it before the end
See Masahito Inouye, Witness Immunity and Bargain Justice: A Look at the Japanese Concept of
the Adversary System, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND
COMPARISONS, supra note 31, at 173–92; Get Serious on Interrogation Reform, JAPAN TIMES, May 14,
2014, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/05/13/editorials/get-serious-interrogation-reform/. The
most influential law professor on the Subcommittee, who was also a member of the parent LDC, had
written an article about the possibility of introducing plea bargaining into Japan more than ten years earlier.
61
MASAYUKI SUO, supra note 54, at 199–201. Suo mentions Muraki’s leadership among members
who wanted a broader range of mandatory videotaping. Id. at 216.
62
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July
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2014,
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most-criminal-interrogations-in-japan-will-remain-opaque; Say No to Plea Bargaining, JAPAN TIMES, July 2,
2014, https://www.japantimes. co.jp/opinion/2014/07/01/editorials/say-plea-bargaining. See also
MASAYUKI SUO, supra note 54, at 129. Suo considers that the mandatory videotaping will cover only 2 to
3% of criminal cases.
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of the term of the Diet in September 2015. However, the Cabinet
presented the bill again to the Diet in 2016, and the bill was finally passed in
May of 2016. The amendments were promulgated in June of 2016 and are
expected to become effective over the next three years.
This case illustrates that members of the criminal justice
establishment who dominate the conventional policy-making process can
limit even reform initiated by a Justice Minister and produce separate
policies that benefit the criminal justice establishment. The requirement of
videotaped interrogations was conceptualized and initiated by a reformist
minister, but the policy-making process was controlled by former and
current members of the criminal justice establishment who were supported
by academics working closely with them. The result was a combination of
a very limited reform based on the initial conception and other unanticipated
policies which would provide new or expanded weapons for the criminal
justice establishment.
Interrogation videotaping has not yet been officially introduced, so
determining how it will be implemented must wait until 2019. Formal
evaluation of the system must also wait until that time. However, police
and prosecutors have been videotaping interrogations on an experimental
basis.65 At least one of these cases serves as a warning that videotaping
alone may not bring about the effects desired by practicing attorneys and
progressive scholars. That is because police and prosecutors may
interrogate suspects on a “voluntary” basis before arresting them. 66
Videotaping will not be required for “voluntary” interrogations, and crucial
confessions can be obtained through such “voluntary” interrogations.
Furthermore, such “voluntary” interrogations can be conducted on an
arrested and detained suspect if the arrest and detention were made on a
separate charge: interrogations regarding one charge can be “voluntary”
interrogations where no videotaping is required if the suspect has been
2015,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/07/national/crime-legal/lower-house-oks-recording-of-suspectquestioning.
65
The Supreme Prosecutor’s Office reported that prosecutors videotaped interrogations in 1325
cases that were eligible to be tried as lay-judge trials from April to September 2016. Kensatsu no “kashika”
zōka [Prosecutors’ “Transparency” Increasing], ASAHI SHINBUN, Feb. 1, 2017, evening, at 10. The
National Police Agency reported that police had videotaped all the interrogations after arrest in 72.8% of
cases which might have been tried by lay judge trials in 2016. Zenkatei kashika 72.8% ni zō: keisatsu
torishirabe 19-nen no gimuka hikae [Transparency of the Entire Process Increased to 72.8%: Ahead of
Becoming Mandatory for Police Interrogations in 2019], ASAHI SHINBUN, May 25, 2017, evening, at 11.
66
See SETSUO MIYAZAWA, supra note 38, at 16–18.
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arrested and detained on a separate charge. Therefore, videotaping does
not necessarily ensure the recording of crucial moments in the interrogation.
The case in point is called the Imaichi Case, in which a 33-year-old
Taiwanese immigrant was convicted for the kidnapping and murder of a
7-year-old girl. 67 Specifically, the Imaichi Case presents three key
problems with the procedures for videotaping interrogations:
(1) videotaping of interrogations will not be required if the suspect
has not been arrested and detained for the given charge;
videotaping of interrogations will not be required even when the
suspect has been arrested and detained if the basis for the arrest
and detention is a separate charge;
(2) the interrogation of a suspect arrested for a minor offense outside
the jurisdiction of lay judge trials will not be recorded, although
the suspect can give a confession for another, more serious
offense in such interrogations;68
(3) a video of an interrogation and confession can be used as evidence
of a lack of coercion and may also serve as substantive evidence
of the guilt of the defendant.
The Imaichi Case is discussed in detail in the following section based
partly on our observation of the trial.69
B.

The Imaichi Case as a Touchstone
1.

What is the Imaichi Case?

On December 1, 2005, a 7-year-old girl (“V”) went missing in
Imaichi City (now Nikko City) in Tochigi Prefecture, which is located
northeast of Tokyo. The next day, her body was discovered in the woods
in the nearby Ibaraki Prefecture. She had been stabbed to death. V was
A Case for Recording All Interrogations, JAPAN TIMES, April 4, 2016, https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/04/13/editorials/case-recording-interrogations.
68
It is estimated that videotaping will be required in only 2–3% of criminal cases. See MASAYUKI
SUO, supra note 54. It means that videotaping will not be required in 97–98% of criminal cases.
69
See Mari Hirayama, Imaichi-Jiken Saiban-in Saiban wa Shikinseki to Narietaka - Bochoki wo
Motoni Ikutsukano Keijitetsuzuki jono Juyona Kadai wo Ronjiru [Can the Imaichi Case Lay Judge Trial
Become a Touchstone Case - Discussing Some Significant Issues in the Criminal Procedure through Trial
Observations], 739 HOGAKU SEMINA 1, 1–5 (2016).
67
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last seen on her way home from school. Witnesses reported seeing a
suspicious white vehicle near the time and place where V was last seen.70
Tochigi Prefectural Police and Ibaraki Prefectural Police jointly
established investigation headquarters and launched an investigation.
Though the two prefectural police forces mobilized a total of more than
160,000 officers for the investigation and investigated 24,000 possible
suspects,71 they did not make any arrests. The case received a great deal
of publicity, and the police placed posters with V’s picture requesting
information in local police stations.
On January 29, 2014, more than eight years after V’s murder, a man
in his early thirties (“X”) was arrested in Tochigi for possession of fake
handbags with intent to sell, a violation of the trademark law. The Tochigi
Prefectural Police had been conducting an undercover investigation of X as
a suspect in V’s murder for two years. It was clear that the real intention
behind X’s arrest was not to prosecute him for possessing the fake handbags,
but to get him to confess to the unsolved murder.72 X had been a suspect in
V’s murder because he drove a white vehicle that matched the description of
the suspicious vehicle reported by witnesses near the last place where V had
been seen. 73 In addition, because X had graduated from the same
elementary school that V attended, the police thought that X was probably
familiar with the area.74 After his arrest, X was detained in the police cell
of the Imaichi Police Station.75
“Imaichi jiken 1-nen” sōsa nankō: “isshun no kūhaku” toboshii jōhō [“Imaichi Case Year 1”
Investigation Stymied: “Momentary Gap” Meager Information], YOMIURI SHINBUN, Nov. 21, 2006,
morning, at 37.
71
Imaichi jiken yogisha no otoko taiho [A Male Suspect is Arrested in the Imaichi Case], ASAHI
SHIMBUN, June 4, 2014, morning.
72
Of course, the police and prosecution denied that it was “bekken taiho” (arresting and detaining a
suspect for a minor crime in order to interrogate a serious crime which the police and prosecutors are really
interested in), while the defense claimed that it was “bekken taiho.” See “Jiken no nyūsu mita”: hikoku,
higaisha to onaji shōgakkō” [“I Saw It on the News”: Defendant Graduated from Victim’s Elementary
School], ASAHI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Mar. 18, 2016, morning, at 29.
73
Nin’i chōshu go haisha ni: Ibaraki shō-1 satsugai yōgisha, shōko inmetsu ka [Vehicle Scrapped
After Voluntary Interview: Suspect in Murder of Ibaraki First-Grader Could Be Destroying Evidence],
ASAHI SHINBUN, June 5, 2014, morning, at 39.
74
The woods where V’s body was found were secluded and not easy to access unless the killer was
local. See id.
75
As described earlier, in Japan, a suspect can be detained for up to twenty-three days after the arrest
before being indicted. See MIYAZAWA, supra note 38, at 20. Ninety-eight percent of detained suspects are
detained at police detention cells, not at detention facilities operated by the Justice Ministry. This practice of
using police detention cells as “daiyo kangoku (substitute prisons)” has been criticized as a major cause of
false convictions. See Ito, supra note 40.
70
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According to the testimony of the prosecutor who interrogated X
(“A”), on the morning of February 18, 2014, when X’s detention for his
trademark violation was about to expire, X suddenly started to confess to
V’s murder. 76 According to A, when A asked, “You have murdered
someone, haven’t you?” X replied, “How did you find that out?” 77
However, this part of “the first confession” was not recorded by the
prosecution. At the trial, A testified that the very first confession was not
videotaped because he just wanted to put out a feeler and never expected
that X would actually start to confess. The Prosecutor’s Office, in haste,
started to record the rest of the interrogation, beginning that afternoon.
However, when the prosecutor resumed the interrogation, X kept saying “I
was panicked in the morning,” or, “I do not remember what I said in the
morning.” X was indicted for his violation of the trademark law on that
day and was detained as an indicted defendant. The police and prosecutors
continued to interrogate X for the murder as a “voluntary interrogation”
because X had not yet been arrested for the murder. Most—but not
all—interrogations by the prosecution were recorded after the very first
“confession” on February 18th, and some of the police interrogations were
also recorded. There were more than 86 hours of recorded interrogation,78
and seven hours and thirteen minutes of them were shown at the trial, based
on the agreement between the prosecution and the defense. In the long but
“voluntary” interrogations shown at the trial, X often changed his statements.
He admitted that he had kidnapped and killed V, but then he changed his
story and said that that he had kidnapped V but had not killed her, and then
he denied everything.79
These interrogations were conducted while X was being charged with
a violation of the trademark law. X was finally arrested for the murder on
June 3, 2014, and then indicted on June 24th. The court, the prosecution,
and the defense had met more than 20 times for pretrial meetings before the
trial, which started almost 10 years and 4 months after the crime.80

Jihaku no yōsu kensatsukan shōgen: Imaichi jiken kōhan hikokunin shitsumon mo [Prosecutor
Testifies on Circumstances of the Confession: Imaichi Case Public Trial and Defendant Questioning],
YOMIURI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Mar. 10, 2016, morning, at 33.
77
Tochigi sho-1 satsugai 32-sai otoko taiho [32-year-old Man is Arrested for the Murder of the
First-grader in Tochigi], ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 4, 2014.
78
The total sum of the hours of interrogations against X is, of course, much greater.
79
Sadamaranu jihaku shinjitsu wa [Uncertain Confession, Where Is the Truth?], YOMIURI SHINBUN,
Apr. 20, 2016 (Tochigi), morning, at 35.
80
Jiken hassei kara 10-nen 4-kagetsu [10 Years and 4 Months After the Incident Occurred],
YOMIURI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Apr. 9, 2016, morning, at 32.
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The Lay Judge Trial Turned into Screen Event?

On February 29, 2016, the lay judge trial for the Imaichi Case started
in the Utsunomiya District Court.81 It was one of the most sensational
trials in recent years, and 913 people lined up for the 43 seats available in
the courtroom. The presiding judge was female, and the two junior judges
were male. The lay judges were No. 1 (male, approximately 70 years old),
No. 2 (male, approximately 30–40 years old), No. 3 (male, approximately
30–40 years old), No. 4 (female, approximately 70 years old), No. 5 (female,
approximately 30–40 years old), and No. 6 (female, approximately 30–40
years old).82 Interestingly, there were five prosecutors,83 while there were
three defense lawyers.
Other than X’s confessions, most of which had been recorded, there
was no solid evidence in the case. The police could not find the weapon,
and there were no witnesses at all. Even worse, there were some
inconsistencies between X’s confessions and the evidence on V’s body—for
example, the nature of her wounds and the amount of blood she lost. Even
the forensic doctor, who examined V’s body by police order, testified that
X’s confession did not match his understanding of how the murder was
committed. Other than X’s confessions, the police and the prosecution
relied on circumstantial evidence: (1) the record of the vehicle number
tracking system, which showed that X drove his car in the direction of the
woods where V was found and came back the same night; (2) a cat hair
found on V that matched the hair of X’s cat;84 and (3) an apology letter X
wrote to his mother while he was detained, which just mentioned that he
was “sorry for what [he had] done” and “the trouble [he] caused to [his
mother and everyone],” which X claimed was in reference only to the
trademark violation case.85

Suspect in 2005 Murder of Tochigi Girl Pleads Innocent after Initially Confessing, JAPAN
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/29/national/crime-legal/suspect-in-2005murder-of-tochigi-girl-pleads-innocent-after-initially-confessing/#.V0nFKo9OKUk.
82
These descriptions are based on observations by Professor Mari Hirayama.
83
The victim participation system was applied in this case, and it is normal to have a larger number
of prosecutors participate in such cases. However, assigning five prosecutors was quite unusual, even for
cases with victim participation. This fact suggests the determination and zealousness of the prosecution to
obtain a conviction.
84
This hair was matched using mtDNA. Cats are divided into seventy-one groups by mtDNA.
85
Hikoku no haha e no tegami, kōbō [Argument over Letter to Defendant’s Mother], ASAHI SHINBUN
(Tochigi), Mar. 3, 2016, morning, at 29 (“Konkai jibun de hikiokoshita jiken de, okāsan ya minna ni
meiwaku o kakete shimai, hontō ni gomennasai.”).
81
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Given the lack of direct evidence and limited circumstantial evidence,
the prosecution relied heavily on X’s confessions, especially the recorded
confessions. This trial was not the first trial in which DVDs of recorded
confessions were played.86 However, this trial gathered the most attention
because the crime was unresolved for nearly 9 years and because the case
was quite rare in that, despite his confession, the defendant “completely
denied the guilt.”87
On the eighth day of the trial, March 10, 2016, the Court began to
examine the recorded confessions in the courtroom. It began with the
interrogation conducted on the afternoon of February 18, 2014, the first day
X confessed to V’s murder. However, as previously noted, the prosecutors
did not record the part of X’s confession in which he admitted his guilt for
the first time. Thus, this portion of the confession was not played. The
professional judges, the lay judges, the defendant, and the defense lawyers
watched the DVD on the screen before them, and there were screens on the
side walls for the audience in the public seats. In the DVD, Prosecutor A
asked X about him confessing his guilt in the morning, but, as described
above, X replied that “I was panicked” or “I don’t remember.” A then tried
to confirm X’s confession by asking “whether you killed the victim or not,”
but X replied only by groaning or sighing.88
Then the interrogation conducted on February 21, 2014 was played.
X still made ambiguous statements and told A that he had had nightmares
after the crime. Next, the recording of the interrogation on February 25th
was played. A called X a “coward,” saying, “You will be grudged by the
bereaved family through your life.” X shouted, “I cannot take this” a few
times, and he ran to the window and tried to jump. The police officer
present in the interrogation room subdued X. When this recording was
played at trial, the silent courtroom resounded for several minutes with X’s
sobbing in the video. Next, the interrogation of February 27 was played.

For an explanation of how DVDs of recorded interrogations have been treated as evidence in trials
recently, see Kazuhiro Maruyama, Torishirabe DVD no Jissitsu Shoko-ka [DVDs of Recorded
Interrogations Have Become Actual Evidence], 82 KIKAN KEIJI BENGO 50, 57 (2015).
87
Unlike criminal procedure in the United States, trials are held in Japan even when the defendant
pleads guilty, so that most criminal trials are uncontested and the only issue is sentencing. There is no “plea
bargaining” to avoid trials in Japan. For more info on criminal procedure in Japan, see Ito, supra note 40.
88
Torishirabe rokuon, rokuga o saisei: kenji no chōshu namanamashiku [Playing Back the Recorded
and Videotaped Interrogation: The Prosecutor’s Vivid Questioning], ASAHI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Mar. 11,
2016, morning, at 29 (“Kenji ‘. . . Koroshita koto dake kakuninsasete kure. Machigai nai na? Dō da?’ . . .
Hikoku ‘Jikan kudasai.’”).
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A asked X why he ran to the window, and X replied simply, “I thought I
would feel better if I jumped from the window.”89
On March 11, 2016, the ninth day of the trial, the prosecution played
more of the February 27, 2014 interrogation. Prosecutor A addressed X
only by his first name, without any “kun” or “san,” a term usually added
after the name in friendly conversations in Japan. A’s tone was
intimidating.
On March 14, 2016, the tenth day of the trial, the prosecution played
police interrogations dating from June 3rd to June 17th. At the
interrogation on June 3rd, X said “I am sorry” and signed a statement in the
dossier,90 but on the night of that same day, X changed his statement and
said, “I didn’t kill the victim.” At the trial, X claimed that he was assaulted
and threatened, but the three police officers who interrogated X testified that
they did not assault or threaten X during the interrogation.91 However,
because the police did not record all of the interrogation, and so it remained
unclear whether X or the police told a lie.
On March 15, 2016, the prosecution played a recorded interrogation
conducted on June 11, 2014 by a different prosecutor (“B”). The
interrogation was conducted after X was arrested for murder. Quite
differently from A, B spoke with a soft voice and called X “X-kun,” an
honorific title.
According to a newspaper article, 92 the recorded
communication between X and B went as follows:
B: X-kun, what matters here is the attitude as a human. Can
you say you will “live like a human?”
X: I will live like a human.
B: I do not want you to pretend to live like a human. You
must show that from your deep heart. You must not turn
around. You killed V, didn’t you?

Id. (“Tobioritara raku da ne”) (Japanese).
Statements taken at interrogations in Japan are not verbatim records. They are composed by
interrogators and the suspect is asked to sign them.
91
Keikan, jihaku kyōyō o hitei: “hitai no kega, jishō” [Police Officers Deny Coerced Confession:
“Head Injury Was Self-Inflicted”], ASAHI SHINBUN, Mar. 15, 2016, morning, at 37.
92
Saiban deno hinin nai [I Will Not Deny at the Trial], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 16, 2016.
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X: Yes.
Then X explained, with a gesture and tears, how he stabbed and killed
V. After he made these statements, he said, “Thank you. I am
relieved.”93 X even said to B, “If we had met in a different situation, we
would be friends.”94
Contrasting the interrogations of X by A with those by B might
clearly indicate the strategy of “Good Cop versus Bad Cop.” In fact, at the
trial, X claimed that the reason why he cooperated with B was that he didn’t
want to be disliked by B. The defense lawyer also argued that the X’s
confession to B was made under the influence of intimidating interrogation
by A and the police officers.95
The Court, however, granted the voluntariness of the confessions
made to A on the 14th day of the trial, March 18, 2016.96 Under Article
6-2 (2) of the Act on Criminal Trials with the Participation of Saiban-in, the
voluntariness of confessions is deliberated and decided only by professional
judges even in lay judge trials. On the day of the verdict, April 8, 2017,97
the court granted the reliability of the confessions made to B, found X guilty,
and sentenced him to an indefinite imprisonment.98
A review of the judgment document 99 suggested that the Court
placed a high value on the recorded confession to B. On the one hand, the
Court clearly denied the value of the circumstantial evidence stated above,
and clearly stated that the inferences from that circumstantial evidence were
limited.100 On the other hand, the Court recognized the reliability of the
Id.
At the closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned this remark by the defendant.
95
See “I Saw It on the News”: Defendant, Victim from Same Elementary School, supra note 72.
96
Noguchi Reiko, Tochigi, kyū-Imaichi-shi no shō-1 joji satsugai: jihaku chōsho saiyō rokuon,
rokuga, kimete ni “rieki yūdō” mitomezu [Murder of a First-Grade Girl in the Former City of Imaichi,
Tochigi: Confession Records Admitted into Evidence, Recording and Videotaping Were the Decisive Factor,
“Influence Peddling” Denied], MAINICHI SHINBUN, Mar. 18, 2016, evening, at 15.
97
The verdict date was originally scheduled for March 31, 2016. However, at the last minute, the
Utsunomiya District Court decided to postpone the verdict for one week. Such a postponement is very
unusual, especially in lay judge trials, as courts normally are reluctant to disturb lay judges’ daily schedules.
It seemed that both the professional judges and the lay judges in this case had experienced difficulty in
deciding the verdict.
98
Toboshii busshō semerareta handan [Under Pressure to Make a Decision with Scant Physical
Evidence], ASAHI SHINBUN, Apr. 9, 2016, morning, at 35.
99
Utsunomiya [Dist. Court], April 8, 2016, Heisei 28 no. 245, LEXDB 25542682,
https://lex.lawlibrary.jp/ [hereinafter LEXDB 25542682]. LEXDB is an online legal database in Japan.
100
Id.
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confessions by explaining that “X’s confessions to B are not contradicted
with objective fact”101 and that “X’s confessions are concrete and include
many elements which are difficult to tell unless X himself had experienced
them.”102 These statements demonstrate that, in making its decision, the
Court heavily relied on the recorded interrogations. Reviewing comments
by lay judges given at the press conference after the verdict, the bigger
problem appears to be that the lay judges considered not the dossiers, but the
recorded interrogations as “substantial evidence” to decide the verdict.
3.

Recorded Interrogation: Supplementary Evidence or
Substantial Evidence?

Recording interrogations has been a goal for defense lawyers and
many liberal legal scholars.103 On the other hand, the police and the
prosecution have not supported those movements. This is primarily
because they thought recording interrogations would make it difficult to
interrogate suspects effectively. The lay judge system has changed the
attitudes of prosecutors. In 2012, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office
established the Task Force on Suspect Interrogations in a New Era (“Task
Force”) (Aratana Jidai niokeru Torishirabe no Arikata Kento Chiimu).104
In May 2013, the Task Force concluded that recorded interrogations would
be useful to prove cases and encouraged district prosecutor’s offices to
consider using recorded interrogations not as “supplementary evidence” but
as “substantial evidence.”105 Since then, prosecutors have become more
receptive to recording their interrogations. It seems they realized that
recorded interrogations would be their new weapons.
So, what is the difference between “substantial evidence” and
“supplementary evidence”? Why does it matter? Most defense lawyers
The court was referring to the examined evidence regarding V’s body.
LEXDB 25542682, supra note 99.
103
The JFBA had published a proposal, “Recording Interrogation Act Draft,” in 2003. Proposal,
Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Proposed Legislation for Interrogation Recordings (Dec. 4, 2003),
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/special_theme/data/kashika_rippouan.pdf. Since then, its realization
has been one of the most important issues for the JFBA. See Makoto Ibusuki, Higisha Torishirabe Rokuga
Seido no Saizensen: Kashika wo Meguru Ho to Shokagaku [The Cutting Edge of the Suspect Interview
Recording: Approaches from Law and Empirical Sciences], in HORITSU BUNKA-SHA 332–33 (2016).
104
See SUPREME PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Audio/Video Recording of Interrogations by Public
Prosecutors and Related Future Policies, MINISTRY JUST., http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000102283.pdf
(last visited Aug. 10, 2017).
105
Torishirabe kashika: Saikōken “kashika wa yūkō” hanzai risshō ni katsuyō teigen [Recording
Interrogations: Supreme Prosecutor’s Office “Recording is Effective” Recommends Utilizing it for Proving
Crimes], MAINICHI SHINBUN, May 5, 2013, morning, at 1.
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and liberal legal scholars expected recorded interrogations to be used only
as “supplementary evidence” to prove the voluntariness and the reliability of
confessions.106 They assumed that the primary evidence to be examined at
trial would still be the dossiers, not the recordings.
However, if one values recorded interrogations as more “objective”
and “precise” records of interrogations than dossiers, one would expect that
recorded interrogations could be used as “substantial evidence” of a crime.
Newspaper articles reporting comments by the lay judges at the press
conference after the Imaichi decision indicate that these lay judges agreed
with this perspective. They said: “We could see X’s facial expressions and
gestures well, which played a big part for our decision,” “Since we did not
have a conclusive evidence, the recorded DVD made us to decide,” and,
“Unlike dossiers, the DVDs had good presence. I think playing DVDs at
the trial is significant for lay judges to decide”;107 “There wasn’t any
definitive evidence, but we reached our verdict because of the recordings (of
the confession)”;108 “Without DVDs, I had not decided. They (DVDs)
have played a large role” and “I am not sure what the verdict would be
(without the DVDs).”109 And one alternative lay judge commented: “What
[the defendant] said on video was different from what he said in court, so
our task was to determine which was true.”110
It’s quite clear that the lay judges saw the recorded interrogations as
substantial evidence. The defense team seemed to have understood the
potential impact of the DVDs at trial, but at the same time, it did not seem to
have considered it seriously enough. At the pretrial procedure, the defense
team argued against playing the DVDs at the trial in front of lay judges,
while the prosecution argued that they would present the DVDs as
“substantial evidence” because they knew the impact they were likely to
have on the lay judges. The Court then decided to examine the DVDs not
as “substantial evidence,” but as “supplementary evidence” at the trial. It
See Takayuki Aoki, Torishirabe wo Rokuon-Rokugashita Kiroku Baitai no Jisshitsu Shoko Riyo
[Utilizing Recorded Media of Interrogations as Actual Evidence], 31 KEIO HOGAKU 63 (2015).
107
Jyoji satugai jiken: hikoku ni muki choeki [The Girl Murder Case: The Defendant Was Sentenced
to the
Life
Sentence
with a Possibility
of
Parole], NHK,
Apr. 8, 2016,
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/shutoken-news/20160408/4097412.html.
108
Recorded Confession Decisive Factor in Tochigi Child Murder Case Conviction, MAINICHI, Apr. 9
2016, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160409/p2a/00m/0na/008000c.
109
Torishirabe eizo handan ni eikyo: Saiban-in ra kaiken [Recorded Interrogations Have Impacted
the Decisions: Press Conference by Lay Judges], SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN, Apr. 9, 2016, at 2.
110
“Kanashimi owaranai”: izoku nao kuyashisa [“The Sadness Does Not End”: Victim’s Family Still
Frustrated], YOMIURI SHINBUN, Apr. 9, 2016, morning, at 39 (“Eizō de itte iru koto to, hōtei de itte iru koto
ga chigau no de, dochira ga tadashii ka o mikiwameru sagyō datta”).
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seems that the defense team did not refuse strongly enough to stop the
DVDs from being played at trial, as they also thought that the showing of
the interrogation by A, the intimidating prosecutor, played into their strategy
to claim X’s confession was not voluntary.111
The problem here is that the lay judges (and possibly the professional
judges) heavily relied on what they saw on the DVDs to decide the
verdict.112 The overconfidence in videos or DVDs as “objective” because
“everybody sees the same thing in DVDs” is obvious here. The lay judges
seemed to have convicted X based on the recorded interrogations even
though the police and prosecution did not record the whole process of the
interrogations and presented only partial recordings at trial. The defense
team failed to sufficiently anticipate the powerful influence of partial
recordings and partial showings. A genie is released! Although initially
conceived by defense lawyers and liberal scholars as a method for
protecting defendants from threatening interrogations, videotaping
interrogations has actually become a powerful weapon for the police and the
prosecution.
4.

Implications of the Imaichi Case for the Eventual
Evaluation of the Videotaping of Interrogations

The Imaichi case involved all three problems mentioned at the end of
the preceding section. To repeat, they are:
(1) videotaping of interrogations will not be required if the suspect
has not been arrested and detained for the given charge;
videotaping of interrogations will not be required even when the
suspect has been arrested and detained if the basis for the arrest
and detention is a separate charge;
(2) the interrogation of a suspect arrested for a minor offense outside
the jurisdiction of lay judge trials will not be recorded, although

See Mari Hirayama, Imaichi Jiken Saiban-in Saiban ni okeru Higisha Torishirabe Rokuon-Rokuga
Eizo no Inpakuto - Keiji Saiban no Riariti [The Impacts by the Recorded Interrogations at the Imaichi Case
Lay Judge Trial – The Reality of Criminal Trials], in THE LEGAL PROCESS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: A
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR SETSUO MIYAZAWA’S 70TH BIRTHDAY 198 (Keiichi Ageishi et al.
eds., 2017).
112
Shinichiro Koike, Imaichi Hanketsu wo Ukete: Bubun Kashika Hoan no Mondaiten [The Imaichi
Case Verdict: Problems in Partial Recording of Interrogations], 507 HO TO MINSHUSHUGI (2016).
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the suspect can give a confession for another, more serious
offense in such interrogations;
(3) a video of an interrogation and confession can be used as
evidence of a lack of coercion and may also serve as substantive
evidence of the guilt of the defendant.
The system for videotaping interrogations which will be introduced in
Japan by June 2019 will also involve problems one and two, while the third
may be a fundamental problem common to any system of recording
interrogations. Evaluation of the system to be introduced in 2019 would
clearly depend on the position of the evaluators in relation to the criminal
justice establishment.
Those who belong to, or are close to, the criminal justice
establishment would welcome the third, while they would still want to
prevent the introduction of videotaping, even if it has limitations like one
and two. However, given that such a limited form of videotaping will be
introduced in exchange for a greatly expanded wiretapping system and the
introduction of plea bargaining, the overall reform package would be
considered a success by members of the criminal justice establishment.
Alternatively, those who conceived of and initiated the introduction
of videotaping interrogations as a powerful reform to the criminal
investigation system in Japan, which had long been criticized for
“hostage-taking justice,” will now face an extremely serious dilemma: if
they reject the introduced system of mandatory videotaping for its
ineffectiveness, the investigation system will simply return to the old system
of “hostage-taking justice.” In lieu of the very limited and ineffective
mandatory videotaping, those reformers outside the criminal justice
establishment may want to introduce far more progressive reforms, such as
requiring defense attorney to be present at interrogations. However, given
the structure of the policy-making process dominated by members of the
criminal justice establishment, such reform is highly unlikely. It would
seem, then, that their only option is to adapt to the new reality.
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CONCLUSION: EXPANDING FEELEY’S FRAMEWORK

Malcolm M. Feeley examined cases of criminal justice reform in the
United States, where reforms can be conceived and initiated in a very open
structure, but implementation of the introduced reforms can be handed over
to highly fragmented implementers.
The story of the mandatory
videotaping of interrogations and accompanying changes in Japan shows the
reform process at the other end of the scale, where the members of the
criminal justice establishment who were the targets for reform can exert a
strong influence even at the conception and initiation stages, and have even
stronger control at the implementation and routinization stages. We
believe that Feeley’s theoretical framework can be expanded and made
more generally applicable to court reforms outside the United States. This
could be achieved by introducing a degree of openness in the policy-making
process at the conception and initiation stages, while also introducing the
degree of fragmentation in the policy making process at the implementation
and routinization stages as central independent variables which determine
the course of the reform.

